Penrose New Argument and Paradox

Abstract

In this paper we take a closer look at Penrose’s New Argument for the claim that the human mind cannot be mechanized and investigate whether the argument can be formalized in a sound and coherent way using a theory of truth and absolute provability. Our findings are negative; we can show that there will be no consistent theory that allows for a formalization of Penrose’s argument in a straightforward way. In a second step we consider Penrose’s overall strategy for arguing for his view and provide a reasonable theory of truth and absolute provability in which this strategy leads to a sound argument for the claim that the human mind cannot be mechanized. However, we argue that the argument is intuitively implausible since it relies on a pathological feature of the proposed theory.

Publication
Truth, Existence and Explanation; Piazza, M. and Pulcini, G. (eds.); Boston Studies in the Philosophy of and History of Science, Springer.