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In this paper we show how to introduce a conditional to Kripke’s theory of truth that respects the deduction theorem for the consequence relation associated with the theory.

The paper develops a precise account of a logic of truth and, in particular, the logic of truth of a given truth theory. On the basis of this account maximality considerations are employed for comparing and evaluating different classical logics of truth.

The paper proposes a strategy for understanding metaphysical grounding in deflationary terms and, more generally, proposes a form of methodological deflationism with respect to the notions of ground.

We argue that Reinhardt’s program has greater chances of success than suggested in the relevant literature.

We determine the modal logic of fixed-point models of truth and their axiomatizations by Solomon Feferman via Solovay-style completeness results

This piece continues the tradition of arguments by John Lucas, Roger Penrose and others to the effect that the human mind is not a machine.

We ask under which conditions an axiomatic theory of truth captures a semantic construction and focus on the criterion of N-categoricity.

We provide a proof-theoretic perspective on the ‘Kripke reduction’ of the modal predicate ‘is necessary’ to the complex predicate ‘is necessarily true’.

We investigate whether paradoxes of multiple modalities are genuinely new paradoxes or whether they “reduce” to the paradoxes of single modalities.