Research Papers

The paper develops a precise account of a logic of truth and, in particular, the logic of truth of a given truth theory. On the basis of this account maximality considerations are employed for comparing and evaluating different classical logics of truth.

The chapter gives an overview of the modal paradox and discusses strategies on how to answer them.

The paper proposes a strategy for understanding metaphysical grounding in deflationary terms and, more generally, proposes a form of methodological deflationism with respect to the notions of ground.

We argue that Reinhardt’s program has greater chances of success than suggested in the relevant literature.

The aim of this volume is to open up new perspectives and to raise new research questions about a unified approach to truth, modalities, and propositional attitudes.

Introduction to edited volume.

We develop a semantics for truth and belief that combines ideas from contextualist theories of attitude reports and Awareness semantics for non-idealized belief.

We determine the modal logic of fixed-point models of truth and their axiomatizations by Solomon Feferman via Solovay-style completeness results

Book review of ‘Semantic Singularities: Paradoxes of Reference, Predication and Truth’ by Keith Simmons

This book chapter provides an introduction to, and an overview of, epistemic logic (in German).

In this paper we take a closer look at Penrose’s New Argument for the claim that the human mind cannot be mechanized and investigate whether the argument can be formalized in a sound and coherent way using a theory of truth and absolute provability.

We explore the middle ground between the strong Kleene and the supervaluation scheme as used in Kripke’s theory of truth.

This piece continues the tradition of arguments by John Lucas, Roger Penrose and others to the effect that the human mind is not a machine.

In this note we show that McGee’s ω-inconsistency result can be derived from Löb’s theorem.

This monograph studies predicate approaches to modality, that is, it discusses and explores the view according to which modal notions are best conceived as predicates applicable to names of sentences or propositions.

We ask under which conditions an axiomatic theory of truth captures a semantic construction and focus on the criterion of N-categoricity.

We provide a proof-theoretic perspective on the ‘Kripke reduction’ of the modal predicate ‘is necessary’ to the complex predicate ‘is necessarily true’.

We investigate whether paradoxes of multiple modalities are genuinely new paradoxes or whether they “reduce” to the paradoxes of single modalities.

The second in a two-part investigation, here we apply a general strategy for constructing modal theories over axiomatic theories of truth to the theory Kripke-Feferman.

We give a strategy to construct modal theories where the modal notion is conceived as a predicate. In this paper we obtain Modal Friedman-Sheard.

In the present piece we defend predicate approaches to modality, that is approaches that conceive of modal notions as predicates applicable to names of sentences or propositions, against the challenges raised by Montague’s theorem.

Taking Kevin Mulligan’s ‘The Truth Predicate vs. the Truth Connective. On taking connectives seriously.’ We discuss the distinction between sentential operators and sentential predicates.